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Abstract
We apply graphical modelling theory to identify ﬁscal policy shocks
in SVAR models of the US economy. Unlike other econometric ap-
proaches  which achieve identiﬁcation by relying on potentially con-
tentious a priori assumptions  graphical modelling is a data based
tool. Our results are in line with Keynesian theoretical models, being
also quantitatively similar to those obtained in the recent SVAR litera-
ture à la Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and contrast with neoclassical
real business cycle predictions. Stability checks conﬁrm that our ﬁnd-
ings are not driven by sample selection.
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1 Introduction
In macroeconomics there is still no widespread consensus on the impact and
transmission channels of ﬁscal policy on many variables. Both theoretical
and empirical studies generally ﬁnd a positive response of output and hours
worked to a positive shock to government purchases and the disagreement
is usually about the magnitude and timing of the response. On the con-
trary, the sign of the responses of variables such as consumption, wages and
investment is still a matter of debate.
In the theoretical literature, on one hand neoclassical Real Business Cycle
(RBC) theory claims that a positive government spending shock triggers a
negative wealth eﬀect that dampens consumption, fosters labour supply and
curbs real wages (e.g. Baxter and King (1993)). On the other hand, Key-
nesian theories and recent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models such as Linnemann (2006), Ravn et al. (2006) and Gali et al. (2007)
among others, assert that an expansionary ﬁscal policy boosts consumption,
hours worked and real wages. In addition, while RBC theories predict that
real output should rise less than proportionally to the increase in govern-
ment spending, due to the crowding-out eﬀect on consumption, Keynesian
theories foresee that the increase in consumption should amplify the expan-
sionary eﬀect on output.
The empirical literature of the late 1990s, such as Ramey and Shapiro
(1998) and Edelberg et al. (1999), mostly relying on vector-autoregressions
(VAR) employing a narrative approach to identify discretionary ﬁscal policy
shocks, supports RBC predictions. More recent empirical studies, starting
from Blanchard and Perotti (2002), adopt structural VARs (SVAR) for the
purpose of identiﬁcation and obtain results more in line with Keynesian
claims.
Indeed, VAR analysis is a standard tool to understand what happens
in actual economies and to evaluate competing theoretical economic models.
SVARs, however, generally require the imposition of a number of restrictions,
which is often a complex and contentious task, as they may be based on
possibly arguable assumptions.
In this paper we conduct a SVAR analysis for the US economy that com-
bines Graphical Modelling (GM) theory. Such an approach allows us to
obtain identifying restrictions from statistical properties of the data. The
starting point is the computation of partial correlations among the variables
in the model and the subsequent construction of a Conditional Indepen-
dence Graph (CIG), a graphical representation of all statistically signiﬁcant
interconnections among all variables. From the CIG, based on well deﬁned
statistical rules, we derive Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), graphical rep-
resentations of the many possible structural VARs, which are later evaluated
by means of statistical information criteria.
Our results are generally in line with the recent SVAR literature (Blan-
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chard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2005), Caldara and Kamps (2008) among
others) and hence give credit to Keynesian claims. In response to a posi-
tive government spending shock, we detect a partially deﬁcit-ﬁnanced ﬁscal
policy and obtain a ﬁscal multiplier of output greater than one. Adding
more recent data increases the magnitude of the ﬁscal multiplier compared
to earlier studies such as Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Private consumption
shows a positive and persistent response to a spending shock. While non-
residential investment is signiﬁcantly crowded out by the ﬁscal expansion,
residential investment rises, comoving with output. However, the crowding-
out eﬀect on non-residential investment is not stable over the sample consid-
ered. Lastly, a positive response of real wages coexists with an increase in
hours worked. As far as the eﬀects of a positive tax shock are concerned, we
ﬁnd that peak responses of consumption, non-residential investment and the
initial response of hours worked show signs consistent with a negative wealth
eﬀect. Subsample checks conﬁrm that results are stable over the sample.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
an overview of recent theoretical and empirical contributions in the ﬁeld of
the macroeconomic implications of ﬁscal policy. Section 3 illustrates the
principles of graphical modelling and how it can be used to identify SVARs.
Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 identiﬁes a number of SVARs to
evaluate the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks on the US economy. Section 6
describes the econometric results and conduct some stability checks. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
Following a positive shock to government spending, textbook IS-LM theory
predicts that consumption should rise and thus amplify the expansionary
eﬀects of spending on output. In constrast, as shown by Baxter and King
(1993), neoclassical Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory generally predicts a
positive response of investment and a negative response of consumption and
wages. As Galí et al. (2007) point out, this substantial diﬀerence across the
two classes of models lays on the more or less implicit assumption made on
the behaviour of consumers: in the IS-LM model, consumption only depends
on current disposable income, hence consumers are all non-Ricardian; in the
RBC model consumption depends on life-time wealth, hence consumers are
all optimising Ricardian agents. In the RBC model, an increase in govern-
ment purchases, through an increase in current and/or future taxes, triggers
a negative wealth eﬀect that decreases consumption, increases labour supply
and decreases wages. The increase in the marginal product of capital, allowed
by the increase in labour, causes also a positive reaction of investment.
The early empirical literature, mainly using vector-autoregressions (VAR),
supports the RBC claims. In general, empirical studies aiming at studying
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the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks confront great diﬃculties in identifying
such shocks, as they have to disentangle the role of automatic stabilisers
responding to business cycles from the eﬀects of discretionary ﬁscal policies.
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) introduce the dummy-variable or narrative ap-
proach, due to Hamilton (1985), in the context of ﬁscal policy, though in
a univariate setting. The methodology consists in constructing a dummy
variable that takes value one at quarters when large military build-ups took
place in the US, in order to identify episodes of discretionary ﬁscal policy.
Edelberg et al. (1999) extend this methodology to a multivariate context,
and Burnside et al. (2000),1 as well as Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005) make
some modiﬁcations. Despite slight methodological diﬀerences, all these stud-
ies generally reach the same conclusions, at least from a qualitative point of
view: in response to a discretionary substantial positive government spend-
ing shock, output increases, consumption and wages decline, non-residential
investment rises, while residential investment falls. Therefore, these ﬁndings
support the neoclassical business cycle literature.
More recent empirical studies aiming at detecting the eﬀects of govern-
ment spending shocks make use of structural vector-autoregressions in order
to trace the impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables of interest.
Fatás and Mihov (2001) ﬁnd that there is a strong, positive and persistent
impact of ﬁscal expansions on economic activity. Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) achieve identiﬁcation by relying on institutional information about
the tax collection, constructing the automatic response of ﬁscal variables to
the business cycle and, by implication, identifying discretionary ﬁscal policy
shocks. The Blanchard-Perotti approach yields a positive eﬀect of a gov-
ernment spending shock on output and consumption and a negative eﬀect
on investment. While these ﬁndings are perfectly reasonable in a Keynesian
world, they are diﬃcult to reconcile with the RBC literature. Perotti (2005)
extends the structural VAR methodology to other countries and reaches sim-
ilar conclusions. Moreover, Perotti (2007) proposes a variant of the narrative
approach that allows the responses to each Ramey-Shapiro episode to have
both a diﬀerent intensity and a diﬀerent shape. In addition, the author in-
troduces a diﬀerent method to build the dummy variable, which allows to
isolate the abnormal ﬁscal events and to estimate the normal dynamic re-
sponse of the non-ﬁscal variables to these events. Using this methodology
the response of consumption is positive, in line with the structural VAR ap-
proach. Mountford and Uhlig (2008) extends Uhlig (2005)'s sign-restriction
approach to ﬁscal policy and ﬁnd a negative response of investment to a ﬁscal
1Within the ﬁeld of RBC models, Edelberg et al. (1999), in addition to their economet-
ric analysis, also build a variant of the neoclassical growth model distinguishing between
residential and non-residential investment to match their empirical ﬁndings. Instead,
Burnside et al. (2000) introduce habit formation in consumption and adjustment costs
in investment to better mimic the timing and quantitative responses of hours worked,
investment and consumption.
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expansion. However, they ﬁnd a small response of consumption, signiﬁcant
only on impact.
In order to match the most recent empirical ﬁndings, the theoretical lit-
erature has recently worked on models able to explain the positive response
of consumption to a ﬁscal expansion. Linneman (2006) uses a non-additively
separable utility function within a neoclassical growth model that is able to
mimic a pattern for consumption similar to the one found by the structural
VAR literature. Ravn et al. (2006) assume habit persistence on the con-
sumption of individual diﬀerentiated goods, which implies a countercyclical
mark-up of price over the marginal cost. A government spending shock has
a negative wealth eﬀect, yet it also boosts aggregate demand, ﬁrms reduce
their mark-up, labour demand increases and oﬀsets the negative income ef-
fect aﬀecting labour supply. As a result, wages and consumption rise. Galí
et al. (2007) cast ﬁscal policy into a new-Keynesian sticky-price model mod-
iﬁed to allow for the presence of rule-of-thumb behaviour. Non-Ricardian
households are key for the purposes of the model, as they partly insulate
aggregate demand from the negative wealth eﬀects generated by the higher
levels of current and future taxes needed to ﬁnance the ﬁscal expansion. In
this model, the magnitudes of the responses of output and consumption are
systematically greater than those generated by the neoclassical model. In
addition, the increase in aggregate hours coexists with an increase in real
wages. This response of wages is made possible by sticky prices. In fact,
even in the face of a drop in the marginal product of labour, real wages can
increase as the price mark-up may adjust suﬃciently downward to absorb
the resulting gap. The combined eﬀect of higher real wages and higher em-
ployment raises labour income and stimulates consumption of rule-of-thumb
households, and the overall eﬀect on consumption is positive.
Table 1 summarises the results of the theoretical and empirical literature
surveyed.
3 Econometric methodology
This section outlines the econometric methodology that we employ to analyze
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks. Subsection 3.1 explains the basic principles
of graphical modelling. Subsection 3.2 illustrates how graphical modelling
can be used to identify structural shocks in a VAR framework.
3.1 Graphical modelling
Graphical modelling is a statistical approach aiming at uncovering statisti-
cal causality from partial correlations observed in the data, which can be
interpreted as linear predictability in the case of a linear regression model.2
2In this context maximum likelihood estimation would be equivalent.
5
Primal contributions to the methodology are due to Dempster (1972) and
Darroch et al. (1980).
The initial step of the procedure is to compute partial correlations be-
tween variables, the signiﬁcance of which can be tested by using appro-
priate statistics. Statistically signiﬁcant partial correlations can be then
represented by an undirected graph called Conditional Independence Graph
(CIG), where random variables are represented by nodes and a signiﬁcant
partial correlation between any two random variables  conditioned on all
the remaining variables of the model  represented by a line known as undi-
rected edge. In Figure 1.A, we show an example of a CIG. For instance, the
edge connecting nodes A and B represents a signiﬁcant partial correlation
between A and B conditioned on C. A signiﬁcant partial correlation implies
conditional dependence if the variables are jointly distributed as a multivari-
ate Gaussian distribution, hence the name Conditional Independence Graph.
When an arrow links the nodes of a CIG, we obtain what is called Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG). DAGs and CIGs imply a diﬀerent deﬁnition of joint
probability. For example, if we consider Figure 1.A, we can assert that A
and C are independent, conditional on C. Therefore, the joint distribution
implied by the CIG is the following:
fA,C|B = fA|BfC|B
while a corresponding DAG such as the one in Figure 1.C2 has a joint dis-
tribution equal to:
fA,B,C = fC|BfB|AfA.
Nevertheless, there is a correspondence between the two, represented by
the so-called moralization rule, as ﬁrstly shown by Lauritzen and Spiegel-
halter (1988). In fact, there is always a unique CIG deriving from a given
DAG, obtained by transforming arrows into undirected edges and linking
unlinked parents of a common child with a moral edge. In the DAG shown
in Figure 1.B1, A and C are parents of B. In order to obtain the correspond-
ing unique CIG we must transform arrows into edges and add a moral edge
between parents A and C as in Figure 1.B2. Statistically, when both A and
C determine B, a signiﬁcant partial correlation due to moralization should
be observed between A and C.3
While there is a unique CIG deriving from a given DAG, the reverse is
not true. What we can observe in the data is a CIG, where every edge can
3An example should provide a more intuitive insight into the moralization rule: if one
wants to become a famous football player (P ), he/she must have good skills (S) and/or
must work hard (W ). Therefore S and W are determinants of P . Conditional on P , there
may be cases where S is high and W is low; cases where W is high and S is low; and
cases where both S and W are high. There cannot be cases where S and W are both low,
otherwise we would not observe P . This example shows that S and W are (negatively)
correlated given P .
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assume two possible directions. Therefore, for any given CIG, there are 2n
hypothetical DAGs, where n is the number of edges. Figure 1.C shows all
the hypothetical DAGs corresponding to the CIG in Figure 1.A. According
to what we have said above, the DAG in Figure 1.C1 is not compatible with
the CIG, because the moralization rule requires a moral edge between A and
C, which is not captured by the CIG.
In the process of obtaining plausible DAGs from an observed CIG, it
might also be possible that some of the links captured by the CIG are due to
moralization and hence must be eliminated in a corresponding DAG. Such
demoralization process, in most cases, can be assessed by considering some
quantitative rules. Let us suppose we observe a CIG such as the one in
Figure 1.B2. If the true corresponding DAG were the one in Figure 1.B1,
then the partial correlation between A and C, ρA,C|B, should be equal to
−ρA,B|C×ρB,C|A. In such a case, when tracing DAG 1.B1, the edge between
A and C must be removed.
Any DAG, by deﬁnition, has to satisfy the principle of acyclicality. There-
fore, the graph depicted in Figure 2 cannot be a DAG as it is clearly cyclic.
The acyclicality in a DAG allows to completely determine the distribution
of a set of variables and implies a recursive ordering of the variables, where
each element in turn depends on none, one or more elements. For example,
in the DAG in Figure 1.C2, A depends on no other variables, B depends on
A and C on B.
3.2 Graphical modelling in the identiﬁcation of a SVAR
Graphical Modelling (GM) theory can be applied to obtain identiﬁcation of
structural VARs (SVAR), as shown by Reale and Wilson (2001) and Oxley
et al. (2009) among others. This literature considers GM as a data-driven
approach that represents a possible solution to the problem of imposing
restrictions to identify a SVAR.
Any SVAR may be turned into a DAG where current and lagged variables
are represented by nodes and causal dependence by arrows. To do so, we
need to establish pairwise relationships among contemporaneous variables
in terms of partial correlations conditioned on all the remaining contem-
poraneous and lagged values. In many cases, it is possible to obtain more
parsimonious models since some lagged variables do not play any signiﬁcant
role in explaining contemporaneous variables and the corresponding coeﬃ-
cient vectors present some zeros.4 In this paper, however, we will consider
SVARs where the data generating process presents all the lagged values, as
it is standard practice in the applied econometric literature aiming at ana-
lyzing the impulse responses of a set of macroeconomic variables. The ﬁrst
step in constructing a DAG representation of a SVAR is the determination
4Reale and Tunnicliﬀe (2001) and Oxley et al. (2009) argue that, in some cases, a
sparse lag structure may yield models with better statistical properties.
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of the lag order through the minimization of an order selection criterion such
as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Hannan and Quinn Informa-
tion Criterion (HIC) or the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). We can
then derive a pth-order vector autoregressive model, m-dimensional time se-
ries Xt = (xt,1, xt,2, ..., xt,m) in canonical (or reduced) form, which can be
expressed as:
Xt = c+A1Xt−1 +A2Xt−2 + ...+ApXt−p + ut
where c allows for a non-zero mean of Xt, each variable is expressed as a
linear function of its own past values, the past values of all other variables
being considered and a serially uncorrelated innovation ut, whose covariance
matrix V is generally not diagonal. The correlation between two errors rep-
resents the partial correlation of two contemporaneous variables conditioned
on all the lagged values. Hence, in order to construct the CIG among con-
temporaneous variables conditioned on all the remaining contemporaneous
and lagged variables, we can derive the sample partial correlation between
the innovations, conditioned on the remaining innovations of the canonical
VAR,5 calculated from the inverse Wˆ of the sample covariance matrix Vˆ of
the whole set of innovations as:
ρˆ(ui,t, uj,t|{uk,t}) = −Wˆij/
√
(WˆiiWˆjj)
where {uk,t} is the whole set of innovations excluding the two considered.
The critical value utilised to test for the signiﬁcance of the sample partial
correlations can be calculated by using the relationship between a regression
t-value and the sample partial correlation, as shown by Greene (2003), and
considering the asymptotic normal distribution of the t-value for time series
regression coeﬃcients. This is given by:
z√
(z2 + ν)
≈ z√
n− p
where n is the sample size, ν = n− k− 1 are the residual degrees of freedom
obtained as a regression of one variable on all the remaining variables and
z represents a critical value at a chosen signiﬁcance level of the standard
normal distribution. Whenever a sample partial correlation is greater than
the calculated critical value, a link is retained.
All arrows end in nodes representing contemporaneous variables. At this
point, the only causality we can assume is the relationship between lagged
and contemporaneous variables determined by the ﬂow of time. Next, we
need to consider all the possible DAGs representing alternative competitive
5Granger and Swanson (1997) have applied a similar strategy to sort out causal ﬂows
among contemporaneous variables, i.e. applying a residual orthogonalization of the inno-
vations from a canonical VAR.
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models of the relationships among contemporaneous variables. Finally, we
compare the DAGs compatible with the estimated CIG by using likelihood
based methods,6 such as AIC, HIC and SIC, and choose the best-performing
DAG.7
In order to construct an empirically well-founded SVAR, we have to as-
sure that the covariance matrix of the resulting residuals is diagonal. A
ﬁrst diagnostic check is thus inspecting the signiﬁcance of such correlations.
Further diagnostic checks are possible. For instance, as this procedure typ-
ically imposes over-identifying restrictions, a χ2 likelihood-ratio test can be
conducted.
4 Data
In order to make our results comparable with the previous literature, we
use the same sample period and data sources as Caldara and Kamps (2008).
Therefore, we use quarterly US data over the period 1955:1-2006:4. All series
are seasonally adjusted by the source.
Our baseline model is a three-variable VAR that includes the log of real
per capita government spending (gt), the log of real per capita net taxes (tt)
and the log of real per capita GDP (yt). Government spending and taxes
are net of social transfers. Government spending is the sum of government
consumption and investment, while net taxes are obtained as government
current receipts less current transfers and interest payments.8 To assess the
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks on a set of key macroeconomic variables, we
follow and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) specify four-variable VAR models
by adding one variable at a time to the baseline model. The other variables
are the log of real per capita private consumption (ct), the log of per capita
hours worked (ht), the log of the real wage (wt), the log of real per capita
private residential investment (R), and the log of real per capita private
non-residential investment (NR).
We extracted the components of GDP, government receipts, and the GDP
deﬂator from the NIPA tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We
obtained real hourly compensation from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
6In some cases, the distributional properties of the variables for diﬀerent DAGs are like-
lihood equivalent, although the residual series are diﬀerent. In such cases, it is possible
to construct DAG models by considering only the lagged variables that play a signiﬁcant
role in explaining contemporaneous variables determined by the signiﬁcant partial corre-
lation. This can help, via comparison of information criteria, determine the best DAG for
contemporaneous variables.
7Even in the presence of non-stationary variables, the sampling properties of GM and
the outlined procedure are still valid, as shown by Wilson and Reale (2008).
8We converted the components of national income and net taxes into real per-capita
terms by dividing their nominal values by the GDP deﬂator and the civilian population.
The latter is available in the ALFRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint
Louis.
9
the measure of per capita hours worked used in Francis and Ramey (2005)
from Ramey's webpage.
5 Identiﬁcation of structural vector-autoregressions
We study the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks from a macroeconomic perspective
by means of structural VAR models identiﬁed through DAGs.
After collecting the endogenous variables of interest in the k-dimensional
vector Xt, the reduced-form VAR model associated to it can be written as:
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + ut (1)
where A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L and ut is a k-dimensional
vector of reduced-form disturbances with E[ut] = 0 and E[utu′t] = Σu.9
As the reduced-form disturbances are correlated, in order to identify ﬁscal
policy shocks, we need to transform the reduced-form models into structural
models. Pre-multiplying both sides of equation (1) by the (k×k) matrix A0,
yields the structural form:
A0Xt = A0A(L)Xt−1 +Bet (2)
In our benchmark case we also include a constant and a linear trend among
regressors. The relationship between the structural disturbances et and the
reduced-form disturbances ut is described by the following:
A0ut = Bet (3)
where A0 also describes the contemporaneous relation among the endogenous
variables and B is a (k×k) matrix. In the structural model, disturbances are
assumed to be uncorrelated with each other. In other words, the covariance
matrix of the structural disturbances Σe is diagonal.
As it is, the model described by equation 2 is not identiﬁed. Therefore,
ﬁrst we restrict matrix B to be a (k × k) diagonal matrix. As a result, the
diagonal elements of B will represent estimated standard deviations of the
structural shocks. In order to impose identifying restrictions on matrix A0,
we apply graphical modeling theory and trace DAGs of the reduced-form
residuals.
A feature of DAGs is acyclicality, which implies a recursive ordering of
the variables that makes A0 a lower-triangular matrix. A0 has generally
zero elements also in its lower triangular part, hence, in general, the model
is over-identiﬁed. The GM methodology has the distinctive feature that the
9We report results obtained by using a 4-th order lag polynomial for all models, as it
is the usual choice with quartely data and is in line with the related literature. However,
using the number of lags suggested by information criteria yields no diﬀerences, as we
obtain CIGs with the same edges.
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variable ordering and any further restrictions come from statistical properties
of the data.
Consistently with the methodology described in Section 3, we build DAGs
of the residuals obtained by ﬁtting the various speciﬁcations to equation (1).
In table 2 we report the estimated partial correlation matrices of the series
innovations and their signiﬁcance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels. These allows
us to draw the CIGs reported in the left column of Figure 3. The statistical
strength of the links is represented by dashed, thin or thick lines, which
reﬂect signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Applying the GM procedure allows us to deﬁne the DAGs reported in the
right column of Figure 3.
DAG a2- baseline. The two edges in CIG a1 cannot be moral, as moral
edges link parents of a common child. The four possible DAGs implied by
CIG a1 are reported in Figure 4. DAG (B) can be discarded because a
moral edge between ugt and u
t
t is not captured in the CIG. Hence, we need to
compare the three remaining models. Table 3 shows that the three informa-
tion criteria reported are minimised by the model implied by DAG (A). The
best performing DAG implies that government spending is not aﬀected con-
temporaneously by shocks originating in the private sector. As we employ
quarterly data and deﬁnitions of ﬁscal variables that exclude most of the
automatic stabilizers, this ﬁnding makes economic sense in the light of the
typical decision and implementation lags present in the budgeting process.
Such an argument is shared by virtually all other related empirical studies.
However, while the related literature uses this argument as an a-priori iden-
tifying assumption,10 in this paper we obtain it as a result. If we ﬁt DAG
(A) to the estimated residuals, we get signiﬁcant coeﬃcients (t-statistics are
reported adjacent to directed edges) and signs compatible with economic
arguments. An increase in government spending has a contemporaneous
(within a quarter) eﬀect on real output, the tax base increases and, thus,
tax receipts contemporaneously rise. As a diagnostic check, we inspect the
cross-correlations matrix of the resulting residuals in Table 4 and ﬁnd that
all cross-correlations lie within two standard errors from zero. We use the
directions obtained for the baseline variables also in the DAGs that follow.
DAG b2- consumption. Same arguments apply to baseline variables. In
addition, uyt → uct , as the opposite would imply a moral link between ugt and
utc, which does not appear in CIG b1. Fitting this DAG yields signiﬁcant co-
10First, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argue that in contrast to monetary policy, decision
and implementation lags in ﬁscal policy imply that, within a quarter, there is little discre-
tionary response of ﬁscal policy to unexpected contemporaneous movements in activity.
Next, Caldara and Kamps (2008), when they apply a recursive approach à la Choleski,
order government spending ﬁrst. Last, Mountford and Uhlig (2008), when using the sign-
restriction approach, deﬁne a business cycle shock as a shock which jointly moves output,
consumption, non-residential investment and government revenue, but not government
spending.
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eﬃcients and signs are compatible with economic arguments. In particular,
a positive shock to income has a contemporaneous positive eﬀect on con-
sumption. All cross-correlations of the resulting residuals are insigniﬁcant.
DAG c2- hours worked. Our best DAG selected on the basis of the infor-
mation criteria (not reported) indicates a strongly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for
the contemporaneous output in the hours equation. Moreover an increase
in contemporaneous hours worked has a contemporaneous positive eﬀect on
tax receipts. The resulting cross correlation between the residual series are
all not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
DAG d2- real wage. The link between ugt and u
w
t , signiﬁcant at a 0.10 level,
may be a moral link in the case in which uwt → uyt . However, information
criteria suggest that uyt → uwt . The positive coeﬃcient of uyt in the regression
of uwt captures a positive contemporaneous eﬀect on real wages of a shock to
economic activity.
DAG e2- residential investment. We apply analogous arguments to those
applied to DAG b2. Here uyt → uRt , as the opposite would imply a moral
link between ugt and u
R
c , which does not appear in CIG e1. Fitting this
DAG yields signiﬁcant coeﬃcients and signs are compatible with economic
arguments. In particular, a boom in economic activity has a contempora-
neous positive eﬀect on residential investment. All cross-correlations of the
resulting residuals are insigniﬁcant.
DAG f2- non-residential investment. The CIG for non residential invest-
ment is the one with the richest set of contemporaneous relationships among
variables. In addition to the relationships already established for the baseline
variables, government spending has a contemporaneous (negative) eﬀect on
non-residential investment. Therefore we need to establish the relationship
between taxes and non residential investment and between output and non
residential investment. This makes 22 = 4 potential DAGs. The information
criteria select the model in which output has a contemporaneous positive
eﬀect on non-residential investment and the latter has a contemporaneous
positive eﬀect on tax receipts. The resulting cross correlations between the
residuals do not diﬀer statistically from zero.
Now, we can use the DAGs depicted in Figure 3 to impose restrictions
on matrix A0. This allows us to identify our structural VAR models. For
illustrative purposes we show what the relationship between the structural
disturbances et and the reduced-form disturbances ut looks like in the model
for private consumption:
1 0 0 0
−a21 1 0 0
0 −a32 1 0
0 −a42 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0

ugt
uyt
utt
uct

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut
=

b11 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0
0 0 b33 0
0 0 0 b44

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

egt
eyt
ett
ect

︸ ︷︷ ︸
et
(4)
In the appendix, we report matrices for all models.
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As anticipated above, matrix A0 is over-identiﬁed, as the assumption of
orthonormal structural innovations imposes k(k+1)/2 restrictions on the k2
unknown elements of A0, where k is the number of endogenous variables. In
the case of four variables, this makes six restrictions. It follows that we have
three over-identifying restrictions.
In Table 5, for all models we report the variable ordering in vector Xt,
the maximum-likelihood estimates of matrices A0 and B, and the likelihood-
ratio (LR) test for over-identiﬁcation. All estimated coeﬃcients have the
right signs and are signiﬁcant at least at a 0.05 level. Moreover, we fail to
reject LR-tests for over-identiﬁcation of all models at any reasonable level of
signiﬁcance.
All the estimated SVAR models identify identical structural ﬁscal policy
shocks. This is clearly depicted in Figure 5, where the identiﬁed spending
and tax shock deriving from the six models above are coincident series.
6 Results
In this section we present empirical results for government spending and
tax shocks by analyzing the impulse responses obtained from the SVARs
identiﬁed above.
Following the procedure by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we transform
the impulse responses of output and its components in such a way that
they can be interpreted as multipliers. In other words, they represent the
dollar response of the respective variable when the economy is hit by a ﬁscal
shock of size one dollar. To achieve this, ﬁrst, we divide the original impulse
responses by the standard deviation of the respective ﬁscal shock. This
allows us to deal with shocks of size one percent. Second, we multiply the
resulting responses by the ratio of the responding variable to the shocked
ﬁscal variable, evaluated at the sample mean.
As far as the impulse responses of hours worked and wages are concerned,
we simply express them as percentage-point changes subsequent to a ﬁscal
shock of size one percent. For each variable we report responses for a 40-
quarter horizon and 90 percent conﬁdence intervals obtained by applying the
procedure due to Hall (1992) with 2000 boostrap replications.
6.1 Government spending shock
In Figure 6 we report results for a government spending shock of one dollar.
Government spending reacts strongly and persistently to its own shock.
It reaches its peak of 1.15 dollars after one year and persistently stays above
baseline (more 95 percent of the shock is still present after two years).
Real output increases on impact by almost 1.10 dollars, slightly decreases
after two quarters, and then rises again up to a peak of 1.75 dollars two years
after the shock. Then, it persistently and signiﬁcantly stays above baseline.
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The spending multiplier is greater than one both on impact and at a longer
time horizon.
Taxes partly oﬀset the one-dollar increase in government spending, since
they rise up to 30 cents, probably as an automatic response to the increase in
output (note that the shape of the tax response mimic that of output). Taxes
reach their peak of more than 50 cents four quarters after the shock. This
suggests that the ﬁscal expansion is at least partially deﬁcit-ﬁnanced. The
response of taxes is also long lasting and statistically signiﬁcant on impact,
after a year, and at longer horizons.
Private consumption shows a positive, smooth and hump-shaped response
to the government spending shock. It increases on impact by 35 cents to
reach a peak of almost 90 cents ten quarters after the shock has occurred.
Then, it persistently stays above baseline.
Private non-residential investment does not move on impact, but declines
afterwards showing a peak crowding-out eﬀect of almost -75 cents one year
after the spending shock.
Residential investment reacts positively on impact to the ﬁscal expansion,
probably following the increase in output, rising by almost 10 cents and
reaching a peak of 20 cents after one year.
Hours worked react positively to a ﬁscal expansion of one percent from
baseline, rising by 0.10 percent on impact and by 0.14 percent after three
quarters. Even if the response of hours is not statistically signiﬁcant at all
quarters, signiﬁcance is achieved at the mentioned quarters and at a longer
horizon.
The response of real wages is slightly negative on impact, as they fall
by 0.06 percent. They turn positive after a quarter reaching a peak of 0.20
percent after two years and persistently stay above baseline.
6.2 Tax shock
In Figure 7 we report results for a tax shock of size one dollar.
The tax response reaches its peak on impact and then declines quite
smoothly till dying out. The policy experiment shows that a tax increase
does not yield any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on output, residential in-
vestment, and real wages. Instead, the peak responses of consumption,
non-residential investment and hours worked are statistically signiﬁcant.
While consumption decreases by 10 cents two quarters after the shock, non-
residential investment rises up to 7 cents three quarters ahead. Last, hours
worked reach their peak at 3 percent, three quarters after the tax shock.
As far as the tax policy shock is concerned, from a statistical point of
view, we are able to comment only on the peak responses of the mentioned
variables. Nevertheless, from an economic point of view, these results are
suﬃcient to detect that a negative wealth eﬀect aﬀects the US economy
when the latter is hit by a positive tax shock. In fact, as a consequence
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of a negative wealth eﬀect we would expect consumption and leisure to de-
cline, i.e. hours worked to rise and private non-residential investment to
increase, given the increase in the marginal product of capital determined
by the increase in employment. The signs of the peak responses of consump-
tion, non-residential investment and hours worked are consistent with this
transmission mechanism.
6.3 Subsample stability
We ﬁrst employ forecast Chow tests to check the overall stability of the
parameters of the estimated models. Once the sample has been split into two
parts, this test allows us to detect whether a structural change has occurred,
by comparing the full sample residual variance with the residual variance of
the whole sample. In other words, the test checks whether forecasts made
exploiting the ﬁrst subsample are compatible with the observations contained
in the second subsample. We start from 1961:3 and recursively repeat the test
at each subsequent data point. Given the tendency of the test to over-reject
the null, i.e. to yield a high type I error (Lütkephol, 2005), we recover p-
values with a procedure based on 2000 bootstrap replications. As we observe
in Figure 8, the test fails to reject the null of parameter constancy on every
occasion at any reasonable signiﬁcance level.
Then we replicate SVAR estimation and impulse response analysis by
removing ten years of observations at a time.
In Figure 9, we report responses to a government spending shock. For all
responding variables but non-residential investment, subsample variability
does not produce changes in the impulse responses able to controvert the
main ﬁndings outlined above.
Figure 10 depicts responses to a tax shock. Except for the responses of
government spending and real wages, also in this case, removing a decade of
observations at a time does not yield very diﬀerent responses compared to
the ones obtained by exploiting the full sample.
In table 6, we report peak responses and their signiﬁcance. As far as the
government spending shock is concerned, the peak responses of all variables
except non-residential investment, systematically show the same sign across
subsample even if their magnitude varies over time.11 In particular, removing
the last ten years in the sample decreases the ﬁscal multiplier.
Signs of the peak responses obtained by exerting a positive tax shock are
stable for tax revenue itself, consumption, residential and non-residential in-
vestment. Hours worked show negative, though insigniﬁcant, peak responses.
However, for at least two quarters after the shock, responses are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant.
11Unlike in the full sample, taxes and hours worked show negative peak responses when
the decade 1965:1-1974:4 is removed but these are not statistically signiﬁcant.
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6.4 Relation with other studies
As discussed in Section 2, the recent DSGE literature regards as a styl-
ized fact that private consumption increases when the economy is hit by an
expansionary ﬁscal spending shock. Our empirical results for the US econ-
omy, relying on an alternative identiﬁcation approach to those commonly
employed in the related literature, support this claim.
With respect to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the ﬁscal multiplier on
output is greater: 1.75 against 1.29. This diﬀerence depends on the inclusion
of more recent data. In fact, when we remove data from 1995:1 to 2006:4,
the peak multiplier declines to 1.31.
Consistently with new-generation DSGE models, we also ﬁnd that while
non-residential investment falls, hours worked and real wages rise as a conse-
quence of a positive government spending shock. As in Caldara and Kamps
(2008), our results also show quite persistent impulse responses for consump-
tion and real wages. This is not the case in theoretical models such as Gali
et al. (2007) where the responses of consumption and wages are initially
positive but they turn negative after one year.
As far as the tax shock is concerned, in principle one may argue that
real output does not respond on impact to tax shocks because the graphical
modelling approach imposes a unique contemporaneous relation from output
to taxes, when the contemporaneous eﬀect of taxes on output may be con-
ceptually important. Caldara and Kamps (2008) in applying the Blanchard-
Perotti methodology to their data ﬁnd that the impact response of output
to taxes does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from zero, which is also captured by our
DAGs. Moreover this result is in line with the results reported by Perotti
(2005).
7 Conclusion
We have applied graphical modelling theory to identify ﬁscal policy shocks
in SVAR models of the US economy. This approach has allowed us to rely
on statistical properties of the data for the purpose of identiﬁcation.
In response to a positive government spending shock we obtain results
in line with Keynesian views. First, real output responds positively and
more than proportionally. Next, private consumption shows a positive and
persistent response to a spending shock. While non-residential investment
is signiﬁcantly crowded out by the ﬁscal expansion, residential investment
rises, comoving with output. Last, a positive response of real wages coexists
with an increase in hours worked.
When we analyse the eﬀects of a positive tax shock, in general, we do not
obtain statistically signiﬁcant impulse responses. However, peak responses of
consumption and non-residential investment, as well as the initial response
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of hours worked are statistically signiﬁcant and their signs are consistent
with a negative wealth eﬀect incepted by the increase in taxation.
The outlined results are stable over the sample period. In general, adding
more recent data increases the magnitude of the ﬁscal multiplier compared
to earlier studies. The crowding-out eﬀect on non-residential investment is
not systematically captured in all subsamples.
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Appendix: Identiﬁcation of SVAR models
Baseline:  1 0 0−a21 1 0
0 −a32 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0
 ugtuyt
utt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut
=
 b11 0 00 b22 0
0 0 b33

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
 egteyt
ett

︸ ︷︷ ︸
et
(A1)
Consumption:
1 0 0 0
−a21 1 0 0
0 −a32 1 0
0 −a42 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0

ugt
uyt
utt
uct

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut
=

b11 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0
0 0 b33 0
0 0 0 b44

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

egt
eyt
ett
ect

︸ ︷︷ ︸
et
(A2)
Hours worked:
1 0 0 0
−a21 1 0 0
0 −a32 1 0
0 −a42 −a43 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0

ugt
uyt
uht
utt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut
=

b11 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0
0 0 b33 0
0 0 0 b44

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

egt
eyt
eht
ett

︸ ︷︷ ︸
et
(A3)
Real wage:
1 0 0 0
−a21 1 0 0
0 −a32 1 0
−a41 −a42 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0

ugt
uyt
utt
uwt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut
=

b11 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0
0 0 b33 0
0 0 0 b44

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

egt
eyt
ett
ewt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
et
(A4)
Residential investment:
1 0 0 0
−a21 1 0 0
0 −a32 1 0
0 −a42 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0

ugt
uyt
utt
uRt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut
=

b11 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0
0 0 b33 0
0 0 0 b44

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

egt
eyt
ett
eRt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
et
(A5)
Non-residential investment:
1 0 0 0
−a21 1 0 0
−a31 −a32 1 0
0 −a42 −a43 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A0

ugt
uyt
uNRt
utt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut
=

b11 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0
0 0 b33 0
0 0 0 b44

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

egt
eyt
eNRt
ett

︸ ︷︷ ︸
et
(A6)
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Model AIC HIC SIC
A 506.00 530.16 565.73
C 507.04 531.20 566.76
D 571.64 551.80 587.37
Table 3: Information criteria associated to the feasible DAGs of the baseline
model.
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(A) A CIG 
 
 
  
(B1) (B2) 
(B) A DAG and its corresponding CIG 
 
 
  
(C1) (C2) 
  
(C3) (C4) 
(C) Hypothetical DAGs deriving from CIG in (A) 
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Figure 1: Conditional independence graphs and directed acyclic graphs.
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C  
Figure 2: Directed cyclic graph.
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(a1) CIG baseline (a2) DAG baseline 
          
          
  
          
(b1) CIG consumption  (b2) DAG consumption 
          
          
 
          
(c1) CIG hours worked (c2) DAG hours worked 
          
          
  
          
(d1) CIG real wage (d2) DAG real wage 
          
          
  
          
(e1) CIG residential investment (e2) DAG residential investment 
          
          
  
          
(f1) CIG non-residential investment (f2) DAG non-residential investment 
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Note: In the CIGs (left column), the strengths of the links are indicated by signiﬁcance at the
0.10 level (dashed line), 0.05 level (thin line), 0.01 level (bold line). In the DAGs (right column),
t-statistics of the estimated regression coeﬃcients are shown adjacent to the directed links.
Figure 3: Sample CIGs and estimated DAGs ﬁtted to VAR(4) residuals.
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Figure 4: All possible DAGs deriving from the CIG of the baseline model.
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(a) Government spending shocks.
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(b) Tax shocks.
Figure 5: Identiﬁed ﬁscal policy shocks across models.
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Note: Dashed lines represent 90% conﬁdence intervals computed according to Hall's (1992) algorithm with 2000
bootstrap replications. Responses are shown for a 40-quarter horizon. The impulse responses of government
spending, taxes and real output are computed on the basis of the baseline 3-variable SVAR. The impulse responses
of the remaining variables are obtained from 4-variable models obtained by adding one variable at a time to the
baseline model. Impulse response of real output and its components are rescaled to represent the dollar change
of the variables to a shock to government spending of size one dollar. The impulse responses of hours worked
and real wages are rescaled to represent the percentage change subsequent to a government spending shock of
size one percent.
Figure 6: Impulse responses to a government spending shock.
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Note: Dashed lines represent 90% conﬁdence intervals computed according to Hall's (1992) algorithm with 2000
bootstrap replications. Responses are shown for a 40-quarter horizon. The impulse responses of government
spending, taxes and real output are computed on the basis of the baseline 3-variable SVAR. The impulse responses
of the remaining variables are obtained from 4-variable models obtained by adding one variable at a time to the
baseline model. Impulse response of real output and its components are rescaled to represent the dollar change
of the variables to a shock to tax revenues of size one dollar. The impulse responses of hours worked and real
wages are rescaled to represent the percentage change subsequent to a tax revenue shock of size one percent.
Figure 7: Impulse responses to a tax shock.
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Note: Bold horizontal lines represent the 0.05 signiﬁcance level. Thin horizonal lines represent the
0.10 signiﬁcance level. Chow forecast test recursively run at every quarter from 1961:3 to 2006:3.
Null hypothesis: parameter constancy. P-values computed with 2000 bootstrap replications.
Figure 8: Chow forecast test (recursive p-values).
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Figure 9: Subsample stability: government spending shock.
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Figure 10: Subsample stability: tax shock.
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